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Abstract
Bar-Ilan (1990) has developed a simple model and a stochastic
model of money demand with overdraft ing. It is shown here that the
simple model is not likely to be important empirically. The stochastic
model is shown to be misspecified and unrealistic. Following previous
work a truly stochastic model is developed with both interest on money
paid and overdrafting allowed. In this model money demand is
independent of the level of interest rates depending instead solely on
the structure of interest rates. Reasons are given for not including
overdraft usage as part of the money supply.

The introduction of overdrafts into standard money demand models
is important not only for those many economies where overdrafts
currently exist, but also because it seems likely that the U.S. economy
is headed toward more formal arrangements and more widespread use of
overdrafting privileges. Adding overdrafts to money demand models along
with interest payments on deposits whether through NOW accounts for
households or through compensating balance arrangements for nonpersonal
accounts is clearly of interest in the U.S. context. However, the so-
called "stochastic" model developed by Bar-Ilan (1990) is wrongly
specified and unrealistic at the same time. In addition, his simple
deterministic model, a variation of the standard Allais, Baumol, Tobin
(ABT) model may not be very realistic. For the stochastic model, the
problems are the all too common mistake of confusing variability with
uncertainty of cash positions and the inappropriate use of a continuous
time model for a process which is by nature discrete. Both problems
stem from a lack of awareness of substantial previous work in the area
of overdrafts and the precautionary demand for both reserves in the
banking context and money in the cash management context.
The purpose of this paper is to correctly specify the stochastic
model and to provide some insight into the question of realism for both
models.
I . The Simple Deterministic Model
Bar-Ilan adds both an interest return on money and the possibility
of using overdrafts to the standard ABT model. Since this model assumes
one income receipt at the beginning of each period and a constant flow
of payments (or alternatively, a constant flow of receipts and one
2payment at the end of the period) it most suitably represents the
typical household or a very small business. Larger economic units are
likely to have highly variable receipt and payment flows which are ill
represented by this type of model. Given this, it is useful to consider
how large per period receipts and payments have to be in order to use
overdrafts in order to hold "bonds" at all. That is, how large must g,
per period income, be for n, the number of transactions in and out of
bonds, to be the minimum of two, and have positive profits? Using Bar-
Ilan's notation, with K being the fixed cost per transaction, a the bond
rate, r the opportunity cost of holding money, p the opportunity cost of
using the overdraft, and having money balances have a maximum amount of
M and a minimum amount of y (< 0) where -fi is the maximum use of
overdrafts, total profit from managing cash will be:
(1) n = J?a - JSUL - B£l -nK
2 2g 2g
with the constraint that g = n(M-p). This corresponds to his cost
function and yields the same results for his equations (3) and (4), that
u = --M
P
\r(P+r)
)
For purposes here, we are interested in profits when n = 2. However, it
is important to note that profits not only must be positive, but must be
greater than a "do nothing" policy of simply earning interest on money
3and not buying bonds at all. If i is the interest rate on money, this
profit is just £im > Since (g/2) (a-im ) is (g/2) r , from equation (1) for
bonds to be bought and the overdraft used at all,
(2) 3L - ¥L - ^l - 2K>
2 g g
Given optimal \i and the constraint that g = 2(M-ji), this results in
(3) g * 8K(P+r)
r(p+2r)
Column one of Table I shows the minimum monthly income (really
take-home pay) necessary to invest and use the overdraft for a fixed
transactions cost of one dollar and for various annualized interest
rates. A two dollar transactions cost would double the monthly income
necessary. Twice a month paychecks (rather than monthly) would double
the amount of per period pay necessary and thus quadruple the yearly
income necessary. Since take-home pay is likely to be in the one-half
to two-thirds range of total income, the minimum take-home pay shown in
Table I suggest that only the upper middle class would buy bonds and use
their overdrafts for transactions demand purposes even with the
transactions cost as low as one dollar.
A comparison of the minimums for the various interest rates is
interesting. The first four lines differ only by the overdraft rate
rising from .10 to .20 and the result is some, but not much, increase in
the minimum necessary. This agrees with Bar-Ilan's finding for the
4stochastic case, that the trigger points for M and n do not vary much as
the overdraft rate is increased. A halving of both the cost of holding
money and the cost of overdrafts doubles the minimum necessary (line 5
compared with line 3). A change in the market rate with both costs
remaining the same leaves the minimum the same (line 7 compared with
line 5). These last two results show that it is the structure of
interest rates rather than their level which determines money behavior
in this model. In particular, discussion of "a rise in interest rates,"
is too ambiguous. For example, a doubling of all interest rates will
widen the cost of both holding money and using overdrafts, and will
reduce the minimum necessary and increase the demand for money. But an
increase of S percentage points for all rates will leave both the
minimum and money demand unaffected. The results may be contrasted with
those for the standard ABT case of no interest on money and no
overdrafts. In this case the minimum income necessary to buy bonds is
$1200 for all cases of Table I except the last (with a = .06) in which
case the minimum is $1600. Contrasting the results with the ABT case in
which interest is paid on money but overdrafts are not allowed, the
minimum is $2400 for the first four cases (for r = .04), and $4800 for
the last three (for r = .02).
Although the size of take-home pay appears to rule out most
households as candidates to both buy bonds and use overdrafts, the
effect on the demand for money is dramatic if indeed they do. Column
two of Table I shows the average money holding as a percentage of
monthly take-home pay (g) . These are without exception very low
percentages when compared with the average money holding of 50 percent
5under the alternative "do nothing" behavior of simply holding money.
The conclusion would have to be that a viable overdraft arrangement
would reduce the household money demand to a small fraction of its
previous level.
Other than the relatively large size of take-home pay necessary to
buy bonds and use overdrafts for transactions purposes, there are other
reasons to question the extent to which such behavior would take place.
Column three of Table I shows the maximum g for which optimal n is still
two and column four shows the profit per month with K equal to one
dollar from investing in bonds and using the overdraft. This profit is,
of course the maximum obtainable whenever optimal n is two. Column five
shows the difference in profit per month from this behavior compared
with the "do nothing" behavior. Clearly these profits are trivial.
Unless the bond transactions are done on a totally automatic basis, any
reasonable accounting of time and effort included in the transactions
costs would swamp out any "profits" possible.
In addition to the relatively large take-home pay necessary and
the small gain in profits obtainable, three other practical factors will
reduce the use of overdrafts and buying bonds. First is the fact that
most households have differential payment rates within a payment period
saving up bills at the end of the period to be paid after receiving
their income. Thus money holdings will be reduced faster at the
beginning of the period and slower at the end. This reduces the amount
that can be invested as well as the length of time held, and thus
further increases the income necessary to make such behavior profitable.
Second is the fact that in many cases minimum deposit balances are
6required for interest payments on the deposit to be paid or paid fully.
Thus drawing down the deposit balance to even some minimum positive
level let alone using an overdraft will reduce profits substantially.
Finally it might be noted that a household could simply use its credit
card more as an alternative to using an overdraft and get free credit
for a month.
Given all these problems it seems highly unlikely that using
overdrafts and buying bonds will ever be significantly important
behavior for households (or other small economic units). This strongly
suggests that overdraft usage if it occurs will occur for credit reasons
rather than for part of managing transactions demands. And this in turn
suggests that overdraft usage should not be included in the money
supply. If it were, we would clearly be confounding credit with money.
II. The So-Called "Stochastic" Model and a True Stochastic Model
The simple model with one receipt and constant payouts (or
constant receipts and one payment) is applicable only to small economic
units such as households. Larger economic units such as firms and state
and local governments typically have highly variable payments and
receipts. Analysis of money demand in this context started with Miller
and Orr (1966) and has been followed by numerous papers, many of which
are cited by Bar-Ilan. Although this type of analysis has certainly
been popular, there are three important problems with it which taken
together suggest that it is both theoretically wrong and empirically
irrelevant. First, and most important, it confuses variability with
uncertainty. Highly variable receipts and payments cause no problems in
cash management that even a dull-pencilled clerk cannot overcome, if the
7variable payments and receipts are known with certainty. In the real
world for a large economic unit, relatively little of the variability is
truly uncertain. Second, cash management is distinctly discrete
depending as it does on cash positions at the end of day. A model such
as Bar-Ilan's which uses continuous time so that "there is zero
probability that money holding will overshoot the thresholds" (footnote
8, page 1204) trivializes the cash management problem. Third,
investment in "bonds" is restricted, but decisions made easier, by
minimum overnight investment amounts.
Consider the case of an economic unit large enough to be in the
market every day. Its daily payments and receipts will certainly be
highly variable. However in the real world, it will know for certain
the precise amounts of good funds to be received and paid out for all
large transactions. And it will have quite good information on the
large number of smaller receipts and payments to effect its balance
today. One important job of a cash manager is precisely to have this
information. The remaining day-to-day uncertainty has been shown to be
relatively small, the errors to be unbiased and not serially correlated,
and in fact to be adequately represented by a normal distribution
(Sprenkle, 1971). All this is greatly different from the typical
empirical work using the Miller-Orr model (see, for example, Orr, 1971),
which makes no effort to distinguish variability from uncertainty. Any
uncertainty tomorrow or later in the week is simply irrelevant for
today's decision as to how much money to hold. (It is of course
relevant for the maturity of the assets to buy or sell.) For a large
economic unit, then, the transactions demand for money (money held with
8certainty as to receipts and payments) should be no more than the
minimum overnight trading unit plus petty cash and any balances held in
small nonoptimized accounts. The remaining day-to-day uncertainty in
receipts and payments gives rise to a precautionary demand for money
depending on the size of the uncertainty and the interest rates on money
and overdrafts if relevant.
For economic units not large enough to be in the market everyday
but still large enough to have highly variable receipts and payments,
the cash management world is somewhat more complicated. The uncertainty
of receipts and payments relevant for cash management will be over a
longer time period than one day and thus larger in comparison with the
size of the unit. The transactions demand for money will be slightly
more difficult, but no real sharp pencils needed, since the clerk will
need to know expected net receipts for each of the next some days. This
along with minimal trading unit sizes over several days will determine
the extent of investing possible, and with knowledge of current interest
rates and transactions costs, whether the investment is profitable.
Given this, the Miller-Orr model seems a dead end, and the
extension of it by Bar-Ilan using continuous time even worse. The
alternative is to use a discrete time model which considers true
uncertainty. Such a model has already been developed and applied to the
case of overdrafts, contrary to Bar-Ilan who states that "no explicit
derivation of the demand for money with overdrafts has been carried out"
(page 1201). The models start with Edgeworth (1888) in the banking
context. Banks managing their reserve position are very similar to
firms managing their cash position. More modern work on banks start
with Porter (1961) and includes among many, Morrison (1966),
Baltensperger (1980), Sprenkle (1987) and Spencer (1989). The model as
applied to cash management was first developed in Sprenkle and Miller
(1980) and later work includes Cuthbertson (1985), Spencer (1986, 1989),
Goodhart (1989) and Zilberfarb (1989). All these models include
overdrafts or bank borrowing and Sprenkle and Miller includes interest
on money (done, however, incorrectly as will be shown) and overdraft
borrowing limits (a suggestion of Bar-Ilan's for future research).
The simple version of the model with no limits on overdraft usage
and no interest paid on money is as follows, assuming for simplicity
that the economic unit is large enough to be in the market every day.
Let x be the forecast error of the end-of-day cash balance, such that
x > indicates unexpected cash needs. Based on the U.S. data mentioned
above, x is assumed to be an independent variable distributed as f(x)
with a zero mean. For Table II we will also assume that x is normally
distributed. Let A, which is to be optimized, be the planned cash
holding. The cost of having money is a, the market rate, and the cost
of using the overdraft is p the difference between the overdraft and the
market rate. The total cost to this large economic unit will be:
( 4 ) TC = af
A
(A-x)f(x)dx + pf(x-A)f(x)dx.
Minimizing with respect to A,
(5) f(A') = P
P+a
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where F(A*) is the cumulative probability that cash needs will equal the
optimal cash holding. Since p is unlikely to be greater than a, F(A*)
is likely to be less than one-half so that the planned holding of money
will be negative. It is this result, which in the banking context
suggests planned negative reserve (or excess reserve) holdings, which
created problems in the banking literature. This can easily be
overcome, however, by the addition of a relatively small fixed cost of
deficient reserves (see Sprenkle, 1987). For a large economic unit
operating under a full blown overdraft system p will be very small
indeed, and interest should be in this direction rather than
concentrating as Bar-Ilan does, on the use of overdrafts as p gets
large. The effects of small p on A* (as a percentage of the standard
deviation of x) are shown in Table I of Sprenkle and Miller (hereafter
SM) assuming x is normally distributed.
Adding interest on deposits to the model is easy. The cost of
holding money is now r rather than a and
(6) f(A') =
p+x
(This result was incorrectly obtained as F(A') = p+g r in SM. ) Clearly
p+a
F(A*), A*, and actual money holdings will be larger, and substantially
larger if r is small as it would be in the U.S. context where close to
market interest rates are implicitly paid on compensating balances.
Also, as for the simple case in part I money holdings are independent of
the level of interest rates depending instead solely on the structure of
rates. Any stickiness on either the overdraft or the money rate when
11
the market rate changes will result in a negative elasticity of money
however
.
Although all the partials are unambiguously signed, because of
nonlinearity it is perhaps more instructive to look at some numerical
examples. Following SM, the average observed cash holding will be,
(7) L = f
A
'(A'-x)f(x)dx
and the average overdraft usage will be
(8) B = r(x-A')f(x)dx.
For a normal distribution with zero mean,
<
9
> L = A'F(A') + a 2 f(A')
and
<
10
> B = -A'[1-F(A')] * a 2 f(A') .
Table II, an extension of Table I in SM shows A*, L, and B as
percentages of a for various levels of p/p+r. As can be seen relatively
small changes in the interest structure will result in very large
changes both in money demand and overdraft usage. Any stickiness in
changes in rates when the market rate changes have large effects. For
example, if the market rate is originally 8 percent and p and r 2
12
percent, if the market rate rises by 10 percent to 8.8 percent and the
overdraft rate and rate on money remain constant, p will be 1.2 percent,
r will be 2.8 percent, and L will fall from ,4a to . 18o—a fall of 55
percent and an elasticity of -5.5. If the overdraft rate rises by .8 so
that p stays at 2 percent, but the rate on money remains constant so
that r is again 2.8, F(A*) now is .4166 and, interpolating from the
table, L will be about .3a and the elasticity about -2.5. Due to
symmetry, the fact that some overdrafts are still used with very high
overdraft rates is simply the other side of the fact that some money
will still be held even with very high costs of holding money. Possibly
the most interesting aspect of Table II is a comparison of the average
money holding compared with a no-overdraft case. With a normal
distribution of x it is literally impossible to never run an overdraft,
but a firm can lower its probability of being overdrawn to any level
desired simply by holding more money. For example, if a firm (and its
banks) decide that being overdrawn on average no more than once a year
is acceptable, then with about 220 working days per year, the
probability should be no more than .0045, and the firm should plan to
hold 2.61a of money. If the probability of being overdrawn should be as
low as .001, then the firm should hold 3.08a of money. For most of the
range of p and r in Table II average money holdings will be very small
fractions of these non-overdraft money holdings. Thus, the introduction
of an overdraft system will have an enormous impact on the corporate
demand for money function just as it would for the household sector.
The model can easily be expanded by adding overdraft limits. In
fact any number of borrowing tranches at higher interest rates can be
13
added. If C in standardized units is the maximum that can be borrowed
at penalty rate p and additional borrowing can be had at a higher rate
p 1 , then total cost is
TC = rf
A
(A-X) f(x) dx + p[
C*A
(x-A) f(x) dx + pcf" f{x) dx
(11)
+ pJ" (x-A-Of(x)dx.
JC*A
It is presumed that the size of C is negotiated for some fairly extended
time period so that optimization is again with respect to A, the planned
cash holding. In this case,
(12) F(A') = -£- * (
,
Pl
^ [1-F(C+A')]p+r {p+i)
F(A*), A*, and L will be larger than before as would be expected, but
the interesting question is the size of the increase. In Table III is
shown average money holdings for a range of three levels of p/p+r and
for p 1 equal to 2p, 4p and 6p, and for overdraft limits of la, 2a, and
3a. For all cases, the loan limit plays a negligible role in money
demand if the loan limit is at least 3a. Since a is the day-to-day (or
at least very short run) standard deviation of cash needs, it will be
small compared to the likely magnitude of any overdraft limit. This
suggests that overdraft limits will not play a role in cash management
unless the firm is borrowing close to its limit for general credit
purposes rather than for cash management purposes.
14
Additional borrowing limits can be added. If c. in standardized
units can be borrowed at p1# and c^ an additional amount at penalty cost
P2 (> Pi)' tnen
< 13
> F(A') =
-2^ * [^f\ [l-F(C^A')} * f^f1 ) [l-Ftq+Cj+A')].
Equation (13) can be expanded by sight to include any number of
additional borrowing trenches if relevant or desired. Additional
borrowing limits, however, will not seriously affect the results shown
in Tables II and Tables III.
Ill . Conclusions
Both the simple model and the truly stochastic model share several
characteristics. Wherever empirically relevant, the addition of
overdrafts will greatly lower the demand for money to small fractions of
its previous level. If interest is paid on deposits, the demand for
money is no longer a function of the overall levels of interest rates,
but depends instead solely on the structure of interest rates. However
any stickiness of either the rate on deposits or the overdraft rate in
effect changes the structure of rates, and will have a large effect on
the demand for money. All of this suggests a more complex total demand
for money function which will be extremely sensitive to small changes in
differential interest rates. Before being too alarmed at the resultant
possible instability of money demand functions, the question of possible
empirical relevance needs to be raised.
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As was shown in Section I, it seems unlikely that overdrafts will
ever be used for transactions purposes, and the household demand for
money will be largely unaffected. For larger economic units possible
instability seems more likely. However banking arrangements in the U.S.
suggest that a further institutional change would have to take place
before the widespread introduction of overdrafting would affect money
demand. Although the use of compensating balance requirements in the
U.S. has fallen since the 1970s, casual observation suggests that
compensating balances are still large. Since compensating balance
requirements are set on the basis of average deposit balance rather than
a minimum, compensating balances can and do serve the dual function of
providing precautionary balances. It was estimated (Sprenkle, 1971)
that for large firms compensating balances were about seven times the
amount necessary for precautionary balances, and significantly more for
those firms with the best cash forecasts. Even a significant drop in
compensating balances, thus would leave enough to meet deposit
uncertainty. And any increase in forecasting efficiency would lower the
precautionary needs. Therefore, unless compensating balance
requirements are ended, the introduction of a broad based overdraft
system in the U.S. is not likely to affect the demand for money of large
economic units.
The suggestion that overdraft usage be included in the demand for
money is misguided at best since whether it is households or firms, most
overdraft usage will not be for transactions purposes but rather simply
a new or different source of general credit. To include overdrafts one
would have to argue that the demand for money should include consumer
16
credit and credit card usage for households and commercial and
industrial bank loans for firms under present arrangements. That
introducing overdrafts shifts the demand for money is nothing new, so
does the payment of interest on money, so does the array of overnight
repurchase agreement possibilities, and so does the use of fees rather
than compensating balances to pay for some bank services. In fact, any
change in the types of characteristics of short term assets and
liabilities will affect the money demand function. Overdrafting in this
sense is no different.
As for future research, the actual cash management behavior of
large economic units needs updating. Compensating balance arrangements
have changed and the last study of cash management and cash forecasting
is over 20 years old (Sprenkle 1971). In addition the forecasting
ability of somewhat smaller economic units along with their cash
management techniques needs serious empirical study. Although obtaining
the day-to-day forecast and actual data is difficult, substantial gains
in understanding money demand behavior should be forthcoming and make
the effort well worthwhile.
CS.1-20
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Table I
Household Characteristics and Overdrafts
Difference
Minimum Average in Monthly
Monthly Money Monthly Profit
Annualized Take-Home Demand as Maximum profit at From "Do
Interest Rates Pay percentage g for maximum g Nothing"
a r D (times K) of a n=2 (K=S1> Policy
1) .08 .04 .02 $1440 .028 $2025 4.19 $.81
2) .08 .04 .04 1600 .063 2160 4.29 .70
3) .08 .04 .08 1800 .111 2314 4.43 .57
4) .08 .04 .12 1920 .141 2400 4.50 .50
5) .08 .02 .02 3200 .063 4320 11.50 .70
6) .08 .02 .04 3600 .111 4630 12.15 .58
7) .06 .02 .02 3200 .063 4320 9.89 .70
Table II
A*, L, and B as Percentages of o for Various r and p
L 1
2.33
.01 2.06
.02 1.66
.05 1.33
.11 .95
.18 .70
.28 .53
.40 .40
.53 .28
.70 .18
.95 .11
1.33 .05
1.66 .02
2.06 .01
2.33
p+r hi
.01 -2 .33
.02 -2 .05
.05 -1 .64
.10 -1 .28
.20 - .84
.30 - .52
a
.40 - .25
.50
.60 + ,.25
.70 + ,.52
.80 + ,.84
.90 + 1..28
.95 + 1..64
.98 +2..05
.99 +2.,33
Table III
Effects of Loan Limits on Money Demand
Loan
Original Limit New L for p 1 equal toP
p-t-r L C 2p 4p_ 6p
.20 .11
.50 .40
.80 .95
la .16 .35 .60
2a .12 .17 .22
3a .11 .12 .12
la .51 .80 1.26
2a .41 .44 .47
3a .40 .40 .40
la 1.04 1.20 1.61
2o .96 .97 .98
3a .95 .95 .95
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